Which Consciousness Can Be Artificialized? Local Percept-Perceiver Phenomenon for the Existence of Machine Consciousness

Conference paper

Shri Lal Raghudev Ram Singh
Artificial General Intelligence. AGI 2025. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), Artificial General Intelligence, vol. 16058, Springer, Cham, 2025

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-032-00800-8_20

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APA Click to copy
Singh, S. L. R. R. (2025). Which Consciousness Can Be Artificialized? Local Percept-Perceiver Phenomenon for the Existence of Machine Consciousness. In Artificial General Intelligence (Vol. 16058). Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-032-00800-8_20

Chicago/Turabian Click to copy
Singh, Shri Lal Raghudev Ram. “Which Consciousness Can Be Artificialized? Local Percept-Perceiver Phenomenon for the Existence of Machine Consciousness.” In Artificial General Intelligence. Vol. 16058. Artificial General Intelligence. AGI 2025. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(). Springer, Cham, 2025.

MLA Click to copy
Singh, Shri Lal Raghudev Ram. “Which Consciousness Can Be Artificialized? Local Percept-Perceiver Phenomenon for the Existence of Machine Consciousness.” Artificial General Intelligence, vol. 16058, Springer, Cham, 2025, doi:10.1007/978-3-032-00800-8_20.

BibTeX Click to copy

@inproceedings{shri2025a,
  title = {Which Consciousness Can Be Artificialized? Local Percept-Perceiver Phenomenon for the Existence of Machine Consciousness},
  year = {2025},
  journal = {Artificial General Intelligence},
  publisher = {Springer, Cham},
  series = {Artificial General Intelligence. AGI 2025. Lecture Notes in Computer Science()},
  volume = {16058},
  doi = {10.1007/978-3-032-00800-8_20},
  author = {Singh, Shri Lal Raghudev Ram}
}

Abstract

This paper presents a novel paradigm of the local percept-perceiver phenomenon to formalize certain observations in neuroscientific theories of consciousness. Using this model, a set-theoretic formalism is developed for artificial systems, and the existence of machine consciousness is proved by invoking Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory. The article argues for the possibility of a reductionist form of epistemic consciousness within machines.